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Multiple Modernities? The Case Against 
Volker H. Schmidt 
1. Introduction 
In the 1990s a new paradigm emerged to conceptualize the contemporary world: 
the concept of multiple modernities. The protagonists of the new paradigm share a 
number of key assumptions about the modern world, as well as a common aversion 
to the modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s which they claim provides an 
oversimplified, empirically incorrect and normatively questionable view of this 
world. The main point of contention is the theory’s premise that modernization is a 
homogenizing process, ultimately leading to the convergence of the societies under-
going it; another its alleged proclivity to equate one particular variant of modernity 
– that of »the« West or, narrower still, North America – with modernity itself by 
elevating it »to the status of a world historical yardstick« (Wittrock 2000: 54). 
Against both views, the critics emphasize modern societies’ diversity. Not only are 
there, according to these critics, several paths to modernity, but different historical 
trajectories and socio-cultural backgrounds also give rise to highly distinct forms of 
modernity in different parts of the world. In fact, even Europe, where it all began, 
exhibits a great deal of cultural and institutional diversity. 
But is that really a new insight? The question is not whether there is diversity in 
the world. There certainly is. But what do we make of it? How much diversity is 
there? What kinds of diversity exist between different modern societies? How pro-
found are the existing differences? What is their social theoretic significance? And what 
are their future prospects? Are they more likely to persist, to withstand further so-
cial change, or do we have reason to expect that they will diminish in the long run? 
Moreover, if we all live in the modern era now, does this imply that all societies are 
equally modern? Or is modernity a matter of degree? What does it mean (or take) to 
be modern anyway? 
To answer questions of this kind one needs a reasonably clear understanding of 
the concept of modernity – or modern society – itself. The literature on multiple 
modernities contributes little to this understanding; it only distances itself from 
what it takes to be the most objectionable views of modernization theory without 
offering an alternative definition or proposal. Instead it largely relies on an implicit 
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notion of modernity which, when closely scrutinized, actually appears surprisingly 
similar to that underlying much of the work of modernization theorists, only thin-
ner. Thus, whereas modernization theory aims to capture the whole structure of 
modern society and all aspects of the dramatic change processes that give rise to its 
emergence, the literature on multiple modernities focuses almost exclusively on 
cultural factors and the ways these are believed to frame politics and the political order 
(as though modernity was identical with its polity), as well as, in some instances, on 
religion. Not surprisingly, to the extent that a theory of modernity is outlined at all, it 
is a self-proclaimed cultural theory (see Taylor/Lee, no year). 
In the pages ahead, I will first present a brief summary of some of the main 
points raised in the multiple modernities literature. This will be followed by a few 
critical remarks and the suggestion of an alternative approach that, while able to 
address many of the former’s substantive concerns, avoids its most serious flaws. A 
brief conclusion sums up what I believe can be learned from trying to put this alter-
native approach to work. 
2. Multiple Modernities: A Brief Discussion 
One view that several authors working with the multiple modernities paradigm 
share is that modernity is first and foremost a cultural »program« – or more preci-
sely, a multiplicity of such programs, not an institutional reality (Eisenstadt 2000). 
Of course it is an institutional reality too, but this reality is itself grounded in, or 
gives expression to, a number of deep-seated »promissory notes«, as Wittrock 
(2000) calls them. Before the various revolutions that we associate with the rise of 
modernity in Europe – the industrial revolution, the scientific revolution, the politi-
cal revolution, the educational revolution – could take place, another revolution, the 
intellectual revolution, had to be accomplished. This intellectual revolution set the 
stage for a fundamental epistemic transformation that made the modern project 
possible in the first place. 
At the core of this epistemic transformation lies the European enlightenment. It 
questions the givenness of social order and raises the awareness of its makeability, 
hence contingency. The concomitant delegitimation of traditional political and 
religious authority sets in motion a process which ultimately leads to the establish-
ment of a radically different order, that of political democracy. In addition to the 
new political order, various other innovations give rise to new institutions which 
become emblematic of the modern world: the rule of law and a legally protected 
private sphere, the market economy, civil society, the freedom of thought and sci-
ence, and others. 
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So far, the account is relatively uncontroversial and could probably be underwritten 
by several modernization theorists as well, even though they might place less em-
phasis on cultural factors and focus more on the socio-economic transformation of 
society. They also have no problem accepting the proposition that modernization is 
a »continuous and open-ended process«, to use the words of Krishan Kumar (1999: 
72). Conversely, the advocates of the multiple modernities approach agree with 
modernization theorists that the »project of modernity«, once it had firmly taken 
root in the West, soon began to have global relevance. 
The main disagreements concern the consequences that modernization proces-
ses have for different societies. As mentioned before, modernization theorists claim 
that societies undergoing such processes tend to become more similar over time in 
their institutional outlooks and culture, whereas their critics from the multiple mo-
dernities camp insist on the prevalence of fundamental cultural and institutional 
differences despite modernization. The very refusal to speak of modernity in the 
singular, rather than of multiple modernities, alludes to this difference. 
But how many modernities are there? At one level, the literature on multiple 
modernities seems to imply that there are as many modernities as there are modern 
societies (which tend to be equated with states in this literature). This reading is 
suggested by accounts of multiple modernities, such as that given by Wittrock, 
according to which there are not only many different varieties of modernity outside 
the Western hemisphere, but also within it. Thus, French modernity differs from 
German modernity differs from Scandinavian modernity differs from American 
modernity and so forth. But that is not really what the protagonists of the multiple 
modernities paradigm want to say. Their main point is that there are modernities 
outside the West that cannot be fully understood in terms of the categories and con-
cepts developed to make sense of Western modernity, or at least that do not and will 
not converge with the institutional forms and structures that modernity has come to 
adopt in the West. Modernity, on this view, crystallizes around major human civili-
zations, such as European (or Western, or Judeo-Christian) civilization, Japanese 
civilization, Sinic civilization, Indian (or Hindu) civilization, Islamic civilization, and 
perhaps even Latin American civilization, all of which leave their imprint on the 
institutions of society, giving them their peculiar shape and »color«, as it were. 
As one can see, in some of the above cases culture and religion are blended, 
making them almost indistinguishable. That may well make sense – depending on 
the force that religion had or continues to have within the civilization in question. 
But does it make sense to speak of Japanese modernity as distinct from Western 
modernity? I doubt it. There are undeniably differences between contemporary 
Japan and contemporary Western countries, as much as there are many such diffe-
rences between any group of countries originating from, or belonging to, other civi-
lizations. The trouble with much of the multiple modernities literature is that it does 
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not really tell us a great deal about what precisely these differences consist in, how 
significant they are and why they might justify speaking of modernity in the plural. 
But we need to know this to judge whether Japan – or whichever region or country 
one may consider – is so unique as to justify, perhaps even warrant, the conceptuali-
zation of its institutional and cultural outlook in its own, and, what is more, even in 
civilizational terms – so different that something very important would be missed if 
Japan were treated as one of several members of a common family of modern so-
cieties. Is that really the case? For instance, is Japan significantly more different from 
Spain than Denmark or Britain or Greece are? And does contemporary Japan have 
more in common with pre-modern Japan than with, say, contemporary Canada or Ger-
many? 
Questions such as these would have to be answered in the affirmative to justify 
the language of multiple modernities, rather than varieties of modernity. If one accepts 
the premise that the breakthrough to modernity is a genuinely revolutionary pro-
cess, matched in historical significance only by the Neolithic revolution, then one 
would probably be hard put to accept such views. My own guess is that the answers 
depend on what precisely is being compared across two or more social entities 
(which need not be states). The multiple modernities literature, however, does not 
even permit posing such questions as the very premises on which it rests imply that 
there must be greater variance across civilizational lines than across time, than across 
epochs in world history. And given that almost everyone agrees that modern so-
ciety, be it in the singular or in the plural, differs from pre-modern societies, the 
assumed differences between the newly discovered multiple modernities must be very 
profound indeed. For if they were not, then there would be no sound basis for 
speaking of modernity in the plural – of modernities. 
Defenders of the notion of multiple modernities might reply that I read too 
much into their accounts and that their aim is simply to highlight cultural differ-
ences that are easily missed when approaching the whole world as one, which mod-
ernization theory seems to do. But while it may well be that modernization theorists 
have a tendency to underrate existing differences, we should also guard against over-
rating them. 
I will now give a brief outline of an alternative approach that, while permitting 
us to speak of modernity in the singular, at the same time leaves ample room for 
considering whichever differences between countries or world regions we have 
reason to emphasize. 
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3. Varieties of Modernity 
As indicated above, I believe a better alternative to accommodate whichever diffe-
rences may exist between different modern societies would be a concept of varieties 
of modernity. The main source of inspiration for this proposal is the new political 
economy literature on »varieties of capitalism« (Hall/Soskice 2001; Streeck/Yama-
mura 2001). Like the multiple modernities literature, it emphasizes difference. How-
ever, the differences that it concerns itself with are seen as family differences within a 
common mode of societal (more specifically, economic) organization, that of 
modern capitalism. Moreover, they are first and foremost institutional differences, 
not cultural ones, even though their socio-historical embeddedness in particular 
cultural and political contexts is well traced and acknowledged. And finally, they cut 
across civilizational lines. 
Two main varieties of capitalism are discussed in this literature: »liberal« capita-
lism, exemplified most clearly by the Anglo-American brand of capitalism, on the 
one hand, and »coordinated« or »non-liberal« capitalism, of which Germany and 
Japan are taken to be the prime examples, on the other. The differences that exist 
between them, as well as the comparative advantages/disadvantages they involve, 
are analyzed at great length, but need not interest us here. What makes this literature 
useful for present purposes is that it permits us to take existing differences seriously 
without giving them too much weight.  
Interestingly, the approach also leads to a regrouping of countries – one that 
plausibly suggests there are several Western countries whose peculiar setup of econo-
mic institutions makes them more similar in this respect to an important Asian country, 
or civilization, than to several of their Western counterparts. Similar findings would 
likely emerge if one extended the analysis to other institutional sectors of society, 
such as various modern societies’ social policy regimes, their political systems, and others. 
Again, one could ask questions such as, is the Japanese welfare state more similar to 
that of Switzerland, the United States, and Great Britain, as their common subsum-
tion under the »liberal« regime type in Esping-Andersen’s work would imply (see 
Esping-Andersen 1990), or does it have more in common with either the German 
variant (on which it was initially modeled to a certain extent) on the one hand, and 
the East Asian »tigers« (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) on the other, 
as suggested by the literature on Confucian welfare capitalism (eg, Jones 1993)? Or 
how about Hong Kong’s very liberal, laissez-faire capitalism? How much of its 
brand of welfare capitalism is peculiarly »Asian« or »East Asian«, and how much 
does it owe to imported Western models? Are the strongly familist and productivist 
orientations of East Asian welfare systems (Holliday 2000) regional peculiarities, 
reflecting deeply rooted cultural dispositions, or rather elements of a universal po-
licy mix whose particular configuration and weight depends on political contingen-
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cies (such as the strength of labor movements), the stage of development (Hort/ 
Kuhnle 2000), and other factors? Next, we may look at Japanese – or South Ko-
rean, or Indian, or Chilean, or whichever – democracy. Are they all categories of 
their own or just particular variants of the three or four basic models of democracy 
found elsewhere in the world? 
What these few remarks suggest is that we must be very precise in our compa-
rative analyses and that it is helpful to go beyond the study of vaguely defined cultu-
res and civilizations and their historical rootedness. Of course we want to know 
how history and culture shape our institutions, but we should also be interested in 
analyzing their concrete form and functioning. Or to put it differently, what does it 
mean to say that South Africa or Brazil constitute different modernities, rather than 
different varieties, or different stages in the realization, of a common modern con-
dition? 
Consider, for example, the field of science. Does it take on a radically different 
shape in India or Egypt than, say, in Italy or the Netherlands? The likely answer is 
that it depends on what one focuses on. If one focuses on the benchmarks used to 
measure the quality of output, then these will either be very much the same everyw-
here or marginalize countries opting for more parochial standards. If, on the other 
hand, one were to focus on questions such as the organization of access to positi-
ons in the science sector, then one would probably find that this is more open (i.e., 
more based on purely technical criteria, signifying a higher degree of functional 
differentiation in the structure of society at large) in one group of countries than it 
is in another, and it may well be that there is a link between the two aspects as indi-
cated by the success of the American science system which appears to be the most 
open in the world. Recognizing this link, other countries may (gradually) follow suit. 
Or lose out. 
Another example is medicine and the perceptions, rules and norms guiding medi-
cal practice. If they are, for all their local peculiarities, not radically different in non-
Western societies from those prevailing in the West, and if whichever differences 
remain have more to do with different economic capabilities than with fundamen-
tally different conceptions of medicine, then what does this signify for notions of 
separate modernities? Why rule out the possibility that some societies are less mo-
dern than others, or are not (yet?) equally modernized throughout the entire struc-
ture of society? And again, it would be hard to find institutional sectors of society 
not raising such questions. 
Wittrock has rightly pointed out that even western Europe has become fully 
modern in certain respects only very recently. Thus, it took until the mid-1970s 
before Greece, Portugal and Spain finally switched to democracy, and until the 
1990s before the last hurdle to universal suffrage was removed in the last Swiss 
canton. Why should similar points not hold for other regions, other societies, as 
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well; across the board or in particular fields? In many African states and in much of 
South Asia girls are still systematically excluded from formal education, receive less 
health care than boys, and are generally considered less socially worthy than their 
male counterparts due to the persistence of pre-industrial (agrarian) value systems, 
as well as social structures supporting them (Drèze/Sen 1995). Are we to ignore 
that? If, on the other hand, a comparative analysis suggested a gradual (slow, une-
ven, often conflictual but nevertheless discernable) trend toward greater inclusion of 
females into the main institutional sectors of society around the world, then what 
would that imply? That other fields, in which more difference may prevail, are more 
important to determine the character of a given society? I doubt that such a claim 
could withstand critical scrutiny. 
Another potentially damaging issue is the following. The differences highlighted 
in the multiple modernities literature are almost always differences located at the 
cross-national or cross-civilizational level. However, we do find quite significant – 
even cultural – differences at the sub-national level as well. For instance, Putnam 
(1993), amongst several others, has demonstrated that there continue to be dramatic 
differences in economic and political performance between northern and southern 
Italy, rooted in deep-seated social structural and cultural differences which in turn 
have been differently conducive to the development of a full-blown capitalist econ-
omy and a well functioning democratic polity. Similar differences have been ob-
served in India, especially between Kerala, arguably the state that has gone furthest 
in dismantling pre-capitalist and semi-feudal structures of economic organization, 
and much of the rest of the country, resulting amongst others in levels of literacy 
and life expectancy that outperform not only those of all other Indian states, but 
also those of many economically more advanced countries in Latin America (Heller 
1999). Are these differences less significant than those existing between, say, Singa-
pore and Luxembourg or Taiwan and Portugal – as one might be led to believe by a 
civilization-centered approach of multiple modernities? If yes, why? If no, does that 
mean that even single nation states may contain different (»multiple«) modernities 
within their borders? Or what does it mean instead? Why give so much weight to 
cross-national or cross-civilizational differences in the first place? The multiple 
modernities literature offers no compelling answers to questions such as these.  
We should also not reject modernization theory’s claims about homogenizing 
trends leading to convergence prematurely. If we define convergence carefully 
enough and avoid equating it with identity, then we may detect trends of conver-
gence even in the very fields that the multiple modernities literature believes lend 
the strongest support to its premises: culture and politics. To begin with the first, 
consider the work of Ronald Inglehart and others drawing upon the World Values 
Survey. This work suggests, says Inglehart (1995: 381), »that economic moderniza-
tion and cultural modernization tend to go together in coherent syndromes« around 
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the world and that the more fundamental differences in worldviews are not among 
industrialized societies but rather between pre-industrial and industrial societies. 
Likewise, empirical work using the framework of the world polity theory of John 
Meyer and others (eg, Meyer et al. 1997) suggests that a world society organized 
around key structural commonalities is emerging due to the rapid spread of a global 
culture encouraging the adoption of similar institutions across the globe. At the 
same time, we have good reason to believe that several of the tendencies that we 
now identify with Western modernity have only recently become widespread even 
in the West. For instance, Beck’s work on »reflexive modernization« (1986) has 
shown that individualization became a mass phenomenon in Germany only begin-
ning in the 1960s – with the onset of the so-called economic miracle; similar obser-
vations have since been made about other Western countries. It has often been 
noted that »Asians’« worldviews, personalities, value systems are less individualistic 
than those of Westerners, and that their everyday moralities tend to be more com-
munity-oriented, more collectivist. But the West’s everyday morality was not much 
different in the past (Phillips 1993). Can we rule out with certainty the possibility 
that today’s so-called »Asian values« are more reminiscent of Europe’s morality of 
yesterday (Senghaas 1998) than reflections of deep-seated civilizational differences 
that are here to stay forever? After all, East Asia – the first non-Western region in 
the world to become fully modern (Tu 2000) – began to modernize much later than 
the West. It would therefore not be surprising if many of the phenomena that we 
associate with modernity were to manifest themselves there later; and there are 
indeed signs that this is precisely what is happening. 
How do such findings square with the notion of multiple modernities? If one 
cannot simply dismiss them as invalid, one must at least address the questions they 
raise for our understanding of modernity or modernities. But the literature on mul-
tiple modernities thus far does not appear to be taking notice of such ephemeral 
phenomena. 
Another seeming point of convergence is in the field of economics where poli-
cies are becoming increasingly more similar. Not only are there many more democ-
racies in the world now than there were 50 years ago, but growing emphasis is also 
placed on the establishment of market economies. »As late as 1965«, writes Jeffrey 
Sachs (2000: 38f.), only the West, Japan and the four East Asian »tigers« (together 
representing just 21 percent of the world’s population) were thoroughly »capitalist 
in orientation«. With the collapse of socialism, the opening up of India and other 
transitions elsewhere, the picture has been rapidly changing over the course of the 
past 15 years or so. Now, the majority of the world’s population lives either under 
capitalist economic institutions or in countries moving toward their introduction 
and consolidation. The outcomes of these transformations are anything but certain. 
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Nor are they painless. Yet, it is hard to deny that they indicate some movement in 
common directions, reducing divergence across countries or civilizations.  
Globally, this process has enormous implications. One of them seems to be the 
reversal of a trend of growing economic inequality between world regions that 
began roughly two centuries ago with the industrialization of Europe and now 
seems to have reached a turning point, leading to a new geography of inequality due 
to the increasing economic potency of late industrializing countries, especially of 
China (Firebaugh 2003). China’s phenomenal rise over the past quarter century has 
not only been the key force behind reducing the world’s poverty level from more 
than half of all people 50 years ago to roughly 20 percent of the world population 
today, it also means that, for the first time in human history, a majority of the 
world’s population will soon live under genuinely modern conditions. China is 
modernizing more rapidly than any other country in the world has ever before, and 
its modernization will very likely change the world’s face radically. The country will 
soon outperform Germany as the third largest economy, and it will eventually be-
come the world’s number one. As a result, it will also become politically more po-
werful. And even though it will in many ways remain different from the contempo-
rary West, it will also become more like it in numerous respects. For instance, we do 
not of course know whether China will ever switch to a democratic political system, 
and even if it does, the kind of democracy it may establish can differ significantly 
from Western-type democracies. But it is already in the process of strengthening the 
legal-bureaucratic type of political authority which Weber believed to be an in-
dispensable prerequisite of successful economic modernization, and if eventually it 
were to adopt a genuine form a democracy, then modernized China would over 
time become more similar to the West. Restrictions on the freedom of thought and 
opinion, as well as that of science, while far from negligible, have already been eased 
and will likely be further eased, even though setbacks are always possible. In 2004 
China amended its constitution to grant a formal right to ownership of private 
property, an institution without historical roots in Chinese culture, but needed to 
fuel the private business sector driving China’s economic growth. Again, the trends 
speak for growing convergence.  
One could go on like this, but the point I have been trying to make should be 
clear enough by now. So what are we to make of it? It is this question to which I 
shall now turn by way of a brief conclusion. 
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4. Conclusion 
There are many differences between different localities in the world: between villa-
ges, towns, cities, provinces, countries, regions, civilizations, and none of the fore-
going is meant to deny them. It is, however, to say that the more fundamental diffe-
rences are between modern and pre-modern social entities, not among modern 
ones. The multiple modernities approach is ill equipped to recognize the revolutio-
nary shift to the modern age, tracing, as it does, the presumably more profound 
differences between civilizations to the Axial Age some 2500 years ago whose reli-
gious, epistemic and cultural transformations are believed to transcend the modern 
and the pre-modern eras and hence to go deeper, to have a more significant and 
lasting impact on contemporary societies’ identity or outlook than their lesser or 
greater degrees of modernization. If they did not, then the very rationale for a civili-
zation-centered approach would collapse. 
I think such an approach is both conceptually flawed and empirically dubious, 
and that a better alternative to accommodate existing differences in the contempo-
rary world would be a yet-to-be-developed concept of »varieties of modernity«, akin 
to, but naturally pitched at a higher level of abstraction than, the notion of »varieties 
of capitalism« emerging from the new political economy literature. Such an appro-
ach would allow us to take differences seriously, but it would have to go beyond 
culture and politics, the two main fields of investigation in the multiple modernities 
school, as well as the economy, on which the varieties of capitalism literature focu-
ses for evident reasons. It would, in fact, have to examine the entire structure of 
society, all aspects of modern life and all institutional sectors. Moreover, rather than 
singling out a few countries for comparative analyses, it would have to cover the 
whole world. 
It would therefore (have to) be much more comprehensive than either of the 
above approaches. The across-the-board comparisons that it would encourage raise 
the possibility that some countries – or other social entities – are in certain respects 
more similar to ones belonging to other civilizations than they are to several mem-
bers of their »own« and vice versa. The notion of multiple modernities suggests 
homogeneity within civilizations; at least more so than across civilizations. The 
notion of varieties of modernity raises doubts as to the soundness of this proposi-
tion, because, following the varieties of capitalism literature, it focuses on instituti-
ons, and these have already been shown to cut across civilizational boundaries in 
some important instances. And while it cannot be known ahead of time whether 
this applies to all other sets of societal institutions as well, one should also not sim-
ply take the existence and persistence of difference for granted. 
To be able to speak of varieties of modernity, one would have to find clusters of 
modern societies with coherent patterns of institutional co-variation, such that a 
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particular type of modernity that scored high on one variable of institutional design 
would also have to score high on another. Now, given the breadth of the proposed 
approach, putting it to work may prove a task of such stupendous proportions that 
it cannot actually be accomplished, at least not by a single researcher or even a size-
able group of researchers. But that need not invalidate the idea behind the proposal. 
For regardless of its feasibility, the mere consideration of its conceptual and meth-
odological prerequisites suggests a lot about the kind of knowledge needed to sup-
port the notions of either multiple modernities or varieties of modernity. Both 
terms make sense only if coherent patterns of the above kind can be firmly establis-
hed for particular clusters of modern societies. For only then would something very 
important be missed about the societies in question by forbearing any sub-categori-
zation whatsoever and referring to them indiscriminately as modern societies or just 
calling them by names of geographical or political origin (such as East Asia or Ja-
pan). 
There is of course the possibility that careful analysis would ultimately lend sup-
port to a civilization-centered approach of multiple modernities because whichever 
varieties of modernity such an analysis may yield turn out to be strongly correlated 
with cultural factors of the sort alluded to in this literature. Conversely, it is equally 
possible that both terms have to be discarded because beyond a number of core 
institutions such as those pertaining to the economy, the political order or the legal 
framework, modern societies simply do not form coherent clusters. In that case, our 
conceptualization efforts would have to target lower levels of aggregation and con-
tent themselves with labels such as »varieties of capitalism«, rather than varieties of 
modernity. 
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